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Introduction
This chapter outlines the philosophical thinking behind this book. Take your time reading 
it and don’t be put off if you encounter words and terms that are unfamiliar to you. These 
terms will become clearer as you read on. The chapter outlines the background and 
assumptions for many of the techniques and suggestions put forward in later chapters. 
Without some knowledge of philosophy or context, technique can become an empty 
process. Philosophy provides principles that can act as a guide when procedural advice 
does not address a particular issue. You might like to read this chapter at the start of your 
thesis process, but it is also likely that you will dip into it from time to time, as certain 
questions arise out of the process of researching and writing the thesis. 
In this chapter, we briefly examine positivist ideas about research: what they are, where 
they come from, why they dominate the general view of research and why there is a need 
to move beyond their limitations. We go on to discuss the alternatives that exist for doing 
social research, which are associated with the post-positivist stance. 
Along the way, we introduce ideas surrounding modernity, epistemology, quantitative and 
qualitative methods and grounded theory. We then go on to review key issues for post-
positivist research: discourse, power, narrative and reflexivity. 
Post-positivist research principles emphasise meaning and the creation of new knowledge, 
and are able to support committed social movements, that is, movements that aspire to 
change the world and contribute towards social justice. 
Post-positivist research has the following characteristics:
l  Research is broad rather than specialised – lots of different things qualify as 
research; 
l  Theory and practice cannot be kept separate. We cannot afford to ignore theory for 
the sake of ‘just the facts’;
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l  The researcher’s motivations for and commitment to research are central and 
crucial to the enterprise (Schratz and Walker, 1995: 1, 2);
l  The idea that research is concerned only with correct techniques for collecting and 
categorising information is now inadequate (Schratz and Walker, 1995: 3).
Positivist views of research
What enters your head when you think about research? When we discuss this question with 
student researchers, they usually come up with words like facts, figures, statistics, writing, 
evaluation, objectivity, science and logic. Traditionally it was thought that there was a single, 
correct set of procedures for investigating phenomena and presenting findings, based on a 
scientific model of research. People sometimes still think that social research should model 
itself on research in the natural sciences. 
Public discussions (think, say, of Morning Ireland on RTÉ radio) about social research 
are usually set in this scientific framework. They centre on questions such as, what is the 
hypothesis? How big is the sample? How representative is the sample? How can you 
generalise if you have a small sample? Was there a control group? The validity of a piece 
of research is assessed by how well it meets these scientific criteria. 
Using scientific method and language to investigate and write about human experience is 
supposed to keep the research free of the values, passions, politics and ideology of the 
researcher. This approach to research is called positivist, or positivist-empiricist and it is the 
dominant one among the general public. 
Positivist researchers believe that they can reach a full understanding based on experiment 
and observation. Concepts and knowledge are held to be the product of straightforward 
experience, interpreted through rational deduction. 
The dominance of positivist assumptions about research has at least two effects. First, it 
leads people to assume that if social research is done properly it will follow the model 
of the natural sciences and provide a clear, unambiguous road to the causes of certain 
social or psychological phenomena. Some assume that it can predict social trends and 
can even be used to control events. It was at one time assumed that positivist-empiricist 
modes of enquiry could produce a science of society. This assumption was in turn made 
possible by the assumption that there were one-to-one correspondences between social 
phenomena and their causes. Most people rightly treat assumptions about causes with 
caution, recognising that it is rarely possible to show a direct cause for some aspect of the 
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social world. But even when people recognise the complexity of social phenomena and 
the difficulty of pinning them down in a scientific way, assumptions may persist about how 
research should be carried out. 
Second, the idea that the only way to do social research is to follow a scientific model can 
lead to the dismissal of research as a valuable tool in understanding the rich complexity 
of social life. This scientific approach which positivism espouses is rightly thought to be 
inadequate when it comes to learning about how people live, how they view the world, 
how they cope with it, how they change it, and so on. 
The context for postivism
Each one of us lives out our lives in the context of a worldview, which influences how we 
think and behave and how we organise our lives, including how we approach research. 
But worldviews often go unarticulated or unnoticed, and we often fail to realise that the 
assumptions we carry about research are related to a particular worldview or mental 
model. We need to uncover our worldviews and subject them to scrutiny. This is especially 
important for those doing research. As social researchers, we work within, not outside, 
broader historical, social and theoretical contexts. These contexts serve as the scaffolding 
for the questions we ask and how we go about answering them. The bigger scaffolding that 
supports positivism is a modernist worldview.
Modernism
A modernist outlook is the cumulative outcome of four foundational movements in 
European thought – the Renaissance, The Reformation, the Scientific Revolution and the 
Enlightenment (Spretnak, 1999: Chapter Two). Within modernist ways of knowing the 
world, only certainty and empirical knowledge are valid, and the rational is valued over 
other ways of knowing, such as intuition. Positivism seeks to reduce everything to abstract 
and universal principles, and tends to fragment human experience rather than treat it as a 
complex whole. (For further reading on modernity, see Goodman, 2003; Spretnak, 1999; 
Tovey, 2001.)
Modernity led to a split between science and literature as different ways of understanding 
human experience. The natural science model came to dominate in social research. This 
became known as positivism or positivist-empiricism. Positivist research places faith in 
quantification and on the idea that using correct techniques will provide correct answers. It 
is also concerned to some extent with prediction and with control. 
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Positivisms
The foregoing review represents classical positivism and there are many variations of it. It is, 
therefore, more appropriate to think of positivisms. We should not forget that a modernist 
worldview has played a large part in the development of ideas concerning liberation, justice 
and freedom. Spaces exist within positivism for radical practice. Many Irish and international 
researchers have used positivist research approaches in the drive to create a more equal 
and just society. Setting up positivism and post-positivism in opposition to each other does 
not adequately represent the more messy on-the-ground realities of how research proceeds. 
Most studies in the natural sciences do not in fact proceed in a defined linear fashion, but 
are the product of web-like and cyclical thinking. The way they are written up however often 
makes it seem as if they proceeded in a linear manner. Positivist visions of science do not 
always reflect the actual practice of doing science (cf Mishler, 1990; Kuhn, 1962). 
Epistemology
The ideas, assumptions and beliefs associated with positivism and modernism constitute 
what is called an epistemological base.
Epistemology is a study of how people or systems of people know things and how 
they think they know things (Keeney, 1983: 13, cited in Scully, 2002: 10). It is thus 
concerned with the nature of knowledge, what constitutes valid knowledge, what can 
be known and who can be a knower.
In recent decades, increasing attention is falling on the limitations of the epistemological 
base of positivism. Within positivism, knowledge has been treated as follows:
l  What counts is the means (methodology) by which knowledge is arrived at. These 
means must be objective, empirical and scientific;
l  Only certain topics are worthy of enquiry, namely those that exist in the public 
world;
l  The relationship between the self and knowledge has been largely denied – 
knowledge is regarded as separate from the person who constructs it. The political 
is separate from the personal;
l  Maths, science and technical knowledge are given high status, because they are 
regarded as objective, separate from the person and the private world;
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l  Knowledge is construed as being something discovered, not produced by human 
beings. 
What has prompted a move away from positivism? 
Opposition to positivist epistemologies has come from feminism, post structuralism, critical 
psychology, anthropology, ethnography and developments in qualitative research. Critiques 
of positivism are implicit in other movements for social change, as well as in the knowledge 
of Eastern, Asian and indigenous societies, who see all events and phenomena as inter-
connected. This kind of knowledge, for so long despised by the Western scientific tradition, 
has now been revitalised. This has come about because the movements and peoples 
concerned have:
l  emphasised that there is no neutral knowledge;
l  shown the inadequacies of dualistic, that is, either/or, or black/white thinking;
l  emphasised the ethical aspects of research.
In addition, complexity science has challenged the dominance of reductionist scientific 
models. 
Recognition that there is no neutral knowledge 
Critics of positivist epistemologies have insisted that divisions between objectivity and 
subjectivity, or public and private knowledge, or scientific and emotional knowledge, are 
socially constructed. Just as important, these artificial divisions, or dualistic ways of viewing 
the world, are used to control ideas about what knowledge is legitimate. Knowledge cannot 
be divorced from ontology (being) and personal experience. 
Collapse of faith in dualistic thinking 
There has been a collapse of faith in dualistic thinking. Post-positivist values in research 
are not about being either subjective or objective, nor do they prefer subjectivity over 
objectivity. They emphasise multiplicity and complexity as hallmarks of humanity. Post-
positivist approaches are interpretive and this has led to an emphasis on meaning, seeing 
the person, experience and knowledge as ‘multiple, relational and not bounded by 
reason’ (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine, 1998: xviii).
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Ethical considerations
Post-positivism has also reawakened questions about the uses and purposes of research, 
research practice and research knowledge, which are at least as much ethical as they are 
technical (Schratz and Walker, 1995: 125). No longer is it good enough for the researcher 
to see the people s/he is researching simply as research subjects from whom information 
is ‘extracted’ (see Chapter Five, on the information-extraction model for collecting data). 
The emphasis is on good principles, adequate for working with human participants in all 
their complexity. Procedures, techniques and methods, while important, must always be 
subject to ethical scrutiny. (For more on ethics, see Chapter Five.)
Complexity science
This historical period is not the first in which a challenge was mounted to the reductionist 
approach of positivism. In the eighteenth century, ‘a few prophetic members’ (Spretnak, 
1999: 21), of the western scientific tradition, such as Goethe and von Humboldt, tried to 
resist the reductionism and mechanistic outlook of the developing natural sciences. Later, 
systems theory, drawing on organic biology, gestalt psychology and theoretical ecology, 
studied ‘organised complexity’. But interest was withdrawn from these theories after World 
War Two, because their concepts could not be expressed mathematically (Capra, 1996, 
cited in Spretnak, 1999: 22).
However, the natural sciences themselves have today been able to take up those ideas 
again, facilitated by the development of fast computers (Capra, 1996, cited in Spretnak, 
1999: 22). Complexity science has shown that ‘various properties of a system emerge 
through its dynamic behaviour and interactions. Such properties cannot be predicted 
mechanistically at the outset from knowledge of the component parts’ (Capra, 1996, cited 
in Spretnak, 1999: 23). The most challenging themes and theoretically exciting questions 
are not reached by the logico-deductive scientific method. Instead they are reached by 
a process that resembles artistic imagination. Einstein imagined that he was riding on a 
moonbeam, looking at the earth, as part of his work. 
Positivism: challenged but not gone
Much work in the natural sciences could now be said to be post-positivist. The ideas that 
the personal is political, that the subjective is a valid form of knowledge (not necessarily 
more valid than the objective, but of equal validity), and that all people are capable 
of naming their own world and constructing knowledge, represent a shift away from 
modernism. Nevertheless, the modernist worldview or paradigm is still strong. Positivism, 
although challenged, is still the dominant public model for research. Researchers can still 
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find it difficult to get funding for post-positivist projects. The mechanistic view of the natural 
sciences continues to dominate the public perception of science, and in turn it affects views 
of what social research should be.
What do post-positivist insights mean for the researcher?
You investigate your own epistemology
Insights about the limitations of positivism and modernity imply that you have to understand 
your own place in the world and what you are bringing to the research by way of 
assumptions about knowledge. Investigating your own epistemologies and understanding 
how they affect you as a researcher is an essential part of the post-positivist approach. 
As part of this investigation, you come to some understanding of how people construct 
and maintain perceptions of the world. Examining your epistemology involves looking at 
the underlying assumptions you use to make sense of our day-to-day lives. ‘You cannot 
claim to have no epistemology. Those who so claim have nothing but a bad epistemology’ 
(Bateson, 1977: 13, cited in Scully, 2002: 10).
The post-positivist stance asserts the value of values, passion and politics in research. 
Research in this mode requires an ability to see the whole picture, to take a distanced view 
or an overview. But this kind of objectivity is different from ‘just the facts’, devoid of context 
– it does not mean judging from nowhere (Eagleton, 2003: 135). It requires a fair degree 
of passion (Eagleton, 2003: 134) – especially passion for justice and the ability to subject 
one’s own assumptions to scrutiny. This requires patience, honesty, courage, persistence, 
imagination, sympathy and self-discipline alongside dialogue and debate. 
Take up a learning rather than a testing role
The post-positivist social researcher assumes a learning role rather than a testing one (cf 
Agar, 1988:12). One of the opportunities and challenges posed by this approach is that 
the researcher recognises the common humanity that connects researchers and the people 
who participate in research. We regard ourselves as people who conduct research among 
other people, learning with them, rather than conducting research on them (cf Wolcott, 
1990: 19).
Positivist researchers believe that their research methods and data mirror reality. Post-
positivist researchers believe that positivist research methods predominantly mirror the 
representational ideology of the positivist researchers. Where the positivist researcher 
might strive to discover objectively the truth hidden in the subject’s mind, post-positivists 
strive to disrupt the predictability that can occur in traditional interviews. Rather than an 
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interviewee providing prepared/manufactured responses to standard questions designed 
to be unbiased and neutral, we strive to engage in social construction of a narrative with 
our participants. In this way we hope to activate the respondent’s ‘stock of knowledge’. 
(Richie and Rigano, 2001: 744)
Value problem-setting rather than problem-solving
Post-positivist researchers do not see themselves as inevitably solving the problems they 
set out to investigate. Research can answer questions and indicate causes (problem 
solving), but equally, research can be about problem setting – coming up with the right 
questions (these may themselves lead to empirical research). This does not mean that we 
go off conducting research without an idea of what is to be investigated – as Wolcott puts 
it (1990: 31), ‘empty-headedness is not the same as open-mindedness’. 
Research can have an open-ended, exploratory character. This reflects the fact that 
problems sometimes have to be discovered. Furthermore, obvious problems should 
not always be taken at face value. Discovering the right way to formulate a problem is 
often as important in the advance of knowledge as hypothesis-testing. (Hammersley, 
2000: 456, original emphasis).
Problem-setting is an intrinsically valuable scholarly activity. Good research is something 
that opens up the nature of problems and sticks with hard questions. It is acknowledged 
that research may indeed reach valuable conclusions, but these are always regarded as 
partial and revisable. There are no universal solutions to problems, therefore conclusions 
may change over time. Many of the problems that we wish to investigate do not lend 
themselves to ready answers, but are more appropriately addressed by research outcomes 
that offer thoughtful guidelines, principles and acknowledgements. 
You are not looking for one overall truth
A critical post-positivist stance suggests that we cannot simply aggregate data in order to 
arrive at an overall ‘truth’. This does not mean, however, that post-positivist researchers do 
not take a political or moral stand, or that they avoid taking action. But it does mean that 
they recognise the complexity of the web of life and experience. They may write with some 
authority, but they keep it reflexive and avoid dogma or authoritarian tones.
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In post-positivist research, truth is constructed through a dialogue; valid knowledge 
claims emerge as conflicting interpretations and action possibilities are discussed and 
negotiated among the members of a community. Researchers don’t ask themselves 
‘is this the truth?’ Rather, we talk about the issues raised during the interviews, the 
participants’ reactions, and our interpretations of these interwoven ideas. In this context, 
it seems right to open up the interpretive discussions [to our respondents], not for them 
to confirm or disconfirm them, but to share our thinking and how the ideas might be 
used. (Richie and Rigano, 2001: 752)
If you are a novice researcher, it may seem that if you follow these principles, you will never 
be able to reach conclusions. Chapter Seven offers some guidance on doing so. 
Doesn’t all this simply mean that we do qualitative rather than 
quantitative research?
It is often assumed that positivism and quantitative methods go together, and that 
post-positivism and qualitative methods are one and the same thing. It is not that 
straightforward. 
Quantitative methods have, it is true, been largely underpinned by positivist principles, 
and they have contributed more than anything else to the over-simplification or reduction 
of human experience (reductionism) and the objectification of the human person within 
social research. Sometimes, however, they are appropriate, and this depends very much 
on the question one wants answered. So if you want to know how many people have 
installed burglar alarms, a quantitative approach is appropriate. If you want to know how 
many people report a fear of being burgled, a quantitative approach will do. But the key 
word here is ‘report’. Respondents may report a fear of burglary, and this can be quantified, 
but it does not tell us anything about how the fear of burglary developed in the first place 
(cf Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). Nor does it tell us how strong the fear is or how close 
people are to acting on their fear. These are much more subjective issues. 
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Quantification can be useful, because it can
 ■  provide a broad familiarity with cases;
 ■  examine patterns across many cases;
 ■  show that a problem is numerically significant;
 ■  often be used as the starting point for a qualitative study;
 ■  provide readily available and unambiguous information. 
However, it 
 ■  cannot look at individual cases in any detail;
 ■  is usually highly structured, which prevents the researcher from following up 
unexpected outcomes or information.
Quantitative research has positivist features when it:
 ■  tries to link variables (features which vary from person to person);
 ■  tries to test theories or hypotheses;
 ■  tries to predict;
 ■  tries to isolate and define categories before research starts and then to determine 
the relationships between them.
Qualitative research
 ■  seeks to provide an in-depth picture;
 ■  generally deals with smaller numbers than quantitative research;
 ■  tries to interpret historically or culturally significant phenomena;
 ■  can be used to flesh out quantitative data;
 ■  tries to isolate and define categories during the process of research;
 ■  is appropriate when the questions posed by the researcher are difficult for a 
respondent to answer precisely;
 ■  tries to illuminate aspects of people’s everyday lives;
 ■  values participants’ perspectives on their worlds;
 ■  often relies on people’s words as its primary data2. 
2 Neither of these lists of features of qualitative or quantitative research is complete – lots of points could be added 
or debated.
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Selecting a method
The appropriateness of quantitative or qualitative methods depends on the questions 
being asked or the issues being explored. One should use methods appropriate to the 
questions.
Key tools of post-postivist research
In the search for meaning, which can lead to value-led social change, we wish to emphasise 
four main tools at the disposal of post-positivist researchers: 
l  the concept of discourse
l  the concern with power
l  the value of narrative
l  the need to be reflexive
The concept of discourse
The post-positivist emphasis on meaning and the relationship between language and 
meaning is addressed in the concept of discourse. A discourse is a web of statements, 
categories and beliefs, habits and practices. Discourse is used to filter and interpret 
experience and the discourses available at a certain historical moment construct the ways 
that people can think, talk about, or respond to phenomena. Discourses ‘invite’ us to be 
human in certain ways, or to respond to others in certain ways. They produce certain 
assumptions (about, for example, women, men, economics, work, childcare, or money) 
and they provide subject positions from which people speak and act. 
Productivity discourse
A contributor to a radio discussion on childcare provision in the December 2005 budget 
said that parents were ‘wasting time’ worrying about childcare and caring for their children, 
when they could be ‘productive in business’. 
The contributor, who remains unidentified, because the focus is on the discourse rather 
than the person who is using it, was drawing on a discourse of ‘productivity’. The central 
premise of this discourse is that every citizen should be productive, meaning that they 
should do paid work. Children, retired people and others who are not in paid work are 
unproductive. This discourse invites us to see human beings in a utilitarian way – we are 
valuable only while we can contribute to the visible economy. Children are asked what 
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they will be, meaning what they will earn money at. Older people are seen as no longer 
‘productive’. Their primary relevance is as consumers of services that target the elderly. 
Migrants are welcome if they ‘contribute to the economy’, narrowly defined as helping to 
increase GDP. 
Every time we talk about these issues in this way, we are drawing on some version of a 
discourse of productivity. Alternatively, if we talk about the importance of unpaid caring and 
voluntary work, and the need to acknowledge the invisible economy, we are challenging 
the discourse of productivity and drawing on other discourses, even if they are muted in 
society. 
Discourse theory has features in common with the concepts of constructs and meaning 
frameworks, but is distinguished from them by its political emphasis, and its ability to 
account for ideology. Discursive practice refers to all the ways in which people actively 
produce social and psychological realities (Davies and Harré, 1990: 45).
From this perspective, discourse, language and visual imagery do not simply ‘reflect’ or 
describe reality, but play an integral role in constructing reality and experience, the ways 
that we know and understand the world, and what we assume to be natural or normal. 
The elaboration of meaning involves conflict and power and the power to control meaning 
in a particular field can often reside in claims to (scientific) knowledge. 
Discourses are regimes of knowledge constructed over time. They include the common-
sense assumptions and taken-for-granted ideas, belief systems and myths that groups of 
people share and through which they understand each other. Discourses articulate and 
convey formal and informal knowledge and ideologies. They are constantly being reproduced 
and constituted, and can change and evolve in the process of communication. 
A discourse is a shared grid of knowledge that one or more people can ‘enter’ and through 
which explicit and implicit meanings are shared (Mama, 1995: 98). In the example above, 
the radio interviewer did not suggest that there were other ways to understand childcare, 
apart from seeing it through the lens of productivity. The interviewee took up a certain 
position from the outset, thus ‘inviting’ the interviewer to share that position. Nevertheless, 
multiple discourses exist, all competing for influence and explanatory power. There are 
other ways to view the issues, which challenge the dominant discourse of productivity. 
When we use discourses we position other people, we take up positions ourselves, and 
in turn other people position us. People are simultaneously positioned in and take up 
positions in a range of discourses, including those surrounding gender, class, race, age and 
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ability. These positions can be contradictory; discourses cut across each other, and cannot 
always be neatly resolved. (For more on discourse, including examples and guidelines for 
using it as an analytic tool, see Chapter Six.)
The concern with power
The discourses available at a certain historical moment condition the ways that people 
can think or talk about, or respond to phenomena. Post-positivist research emphasises 
the struggle for meaning, and the construction of new meanings and knowledges. The 
concept of discourse shows how the fixing of meaning is never a neutral act, but always 
privileges certain interests. Discourse is responsible for reality and not a mere reflection of 
it. Thus, the question of what discourses prevail and whose interests they serve are most 
important (Weedon, 1987: 11). This is not to discount the importance of material issues, 
economics or law, but to emphasise the equal importance of culture and discursive power. 
The production of knowledge is political and has real effects. 
Discursive forms of power are less visible than legal and material ones, but are equally 
important in regulating people, and therefore in the drive for change. An example is the 
production of knowledge about rape and sexual abuse. In the past rape was perceived as 
a sexual crime; now it is also perceived as an abuse of power.
The value of narrative
Davies (1999: 64) points out that people make sense of their lives, for the most part, in 
terms of specific events, and sequences of events. Most people do not articulate how the 
sociological categories of race, gender, class and ethnicity, and so on have shaped their 
subjectivities, learning and experience, or how the larger historical processes, such as social 
movements or demographic transitions, have affected them. Yet, what is remembered is 
remembered precisely because it is socially significant (Stephenson, Kippax and Crawford, 
1996). 
Social structures and phenomena are experienced and understood at the level of the 
individual subjectivity, and expressed in stories about lives. Narratives can show how people 
actively (and sometimes knowingly) take up positions in certain discourses, and how they 
are (interactively) positioned by other people, and by social structures and discursive 
practices.
Narrative is essential to the writing-up of post-positivist research. The researcher tries to 
balance theoretical interpretation with an evocative presentation. This means taking the 
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reader into a story and imparting its mood through linguistic style and narrative exposition. 
This strategy removes the writing from the scientific modes, but without transforming 
the final product into fiction, drama or poetry. Key definitions and distinctions are framed 
in words that reproduce the tempo and mood of the experience. The theory remains 
embedded in the narrative in its many stories. Immediacy draws the reader into the story. 
A mix of concrete detail with analytic categories connects the familiar with the unfamiliar 
(O’Donnell, 2004). 
Narrative and discourse analyses are often criticised as being just about words: the 
implication is that such an approach has no practical use. But virtually all of anyone’s 
understanding of the social world is mediated by discourse in the form of conversations, 
newspapers, novels, TV, stories and so on. For example, none of us has ‘seen’ the Health 
Service, or the educational system, or the social partnership approach, or the community 
development movement, or the Celtic Tiger, or the local employment service, or 
consumerism, or quality of life, or any of the phenomena we might be researching. Yet we 
all have conversations about them, read about them, and have opinions about them.
The concept of discourse is relevant to all considerations of the social world, from broad 
international relations, institutional relations, to intimate and familial relations. Attention to 
narrative and discourse can create awareness of the constructive nature of the media, and 
of state and social apparatuses, institutions and practices. It can also draw attention to the 
importance of who gets to tell what stories about different groups and can help popularise 
new and muted discourses. 
The need to be reflexive
While promoting post-positivist approaches we recognise that there are many competing 
discourses, which give rise to contradictions. We have to embrace these contradictions and 
the tensions they engender. We examine them rather than try to control or resolve them. 
That endeavour gives rise to a tension and creative energy that is not always easy to live 
with. 
Post-positivism is not trying to substitute a more secure and firm foundation as an 
alternative to positivism (cf Lather, 1991: 7). Rather, it strives to ‘produce an awareness 
of the complexity, historical contingency and fragility of the practices that we invent to 
discover the truth about ourselves’ (cf Lather, 1991: 7). It is thus much more than ‘post’ 
– it is actually extra-positivist, because it provides vantage points from outside positivism, 
from which you can approach research.
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This is why a reflexive attitude is so important. This means sticking with the contradictions 
and tensions that arise in the course of our research and not flinching from the challenges 
inherent in them. 
Ongoing reflexivity on the part of the researcher means that we must look critically at what 
is assumed in any approach that assumes that we can ‘empower’ somebody else. As 
Lather (1991: 7) points out, even ‘an intendedly liberatory pedagogy might function as part 
of the technology of surveillance and normalisation’. The same could be said of research.
Post-positivist researchers also recognise that there are limits to research. Research and 
the analysis in which it engages are explicit – both provide evidence for conclusions. 
The need for evidence means that research is not always able to access areas of human 
experience that are more intuitive or ontological. Also, research can be used as an excuse 
for not acting. We say we need more information before we can proceed. But often this is 
just procrastinating, when our intuition – broadly defined as extra-rational ways of knowing, 
honed from experience – tells us what needs to be done. Poetry, visual arts, novels, and 
drama also try to make the familiar strange and can often do that extremely well. The 
post-positivist mode is nothing if it does not also recognise the value of other forms of 
enquiry.
Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the philosophical approach of the authors, which underpins 
the chapters that follow. Aspects of the post-positivist approach are developed throughout 
the book. In this chapter, we have set out some important characteristics, and outlined the 
context in which post-positivism has come about. You can return to this chapter and/or 
specific sections of it, throughout the thesis process. 
